Shining a Light on North Korea’s Illicit Shipping and Sanctions Evasion Practices (Part 4)

Lee Kok Leong, our special correspondent, interviews Mathew Ha, research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, on Pyongyang’s illegal maritime tactics to evade sanctions. The Foundation is a Washington DC-based nonprofit, nonpartisan research institute focusing on foreign policy and national security. Mathew’s research includes North Korea’s illicit financing, human rights, the U.S.-Korea alliance, and inter-Korean relations.

MFT: Besides sanctions, what else do you think the US and international community can do?

FDD: Besides just imposing new sanctions designations, the important outstanding issue is better enforcement of the existing measures. The UN Panel provides several important recommendations that could help reduce North Korea’s chances in successfully carrying out its various tactics at the maritime level.

Specifically, flag registries, especially of nations in which North Korea/North Korea-linked vessels have flown, could play a key role by sharing information about suspect vessels and companies that could be linked to North Korean sanctions evasion. As UN Security Council resolutions 2375 and 2397 provide member states with guidance and requirements to seize and inspect possibly suspect vessels, this shared information will be critical.

While it has been helpful for this UN Panel as well as governments of the US, Japan, Australia, and others who have exposed North Korean maritime sanctions evasion activities, namely ship-to-ship transfers, the next step is to utilize this information and enforce these UN resolutions by seizing vessels that have been found to have committed such activity.

MFT: If the US and the international community is unable to effectively counter Pyongyang’s illegal maritime trade, what is your assessment of the costs and risks to the global economy?

FDD: Considering my research focus is more on security, foreign policy, and strategy rather than the global economy, my best answer to the question is that the greatest cost to not effectively countering North Korea’s illegal maritime trade will be North Korea gaining a significant boost to its asymmetric security assets, namely its nuclear weapons program.

Sanctions were meant to impose the necessary costs to change Kim’s behavior. Forsaking enforcement and enabling Pyongyang’s access to revenue will not only help the regime build more weapons, but could alter the dynamic of its relations with its adversaries in Washington and Seoul.

The development of more advanced capabilities such as long-range missiles, the ICBM, or more advanced nuclear warheads will definitely further embolden those in Pyongyang to conduct more provocative actions and impose far greater threats against the territorial U.S. or against US allies in the future to not only ensure regime survival, but also extort its adversaries South Korea, the US, Japan and elsewhere.